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Este artigo investiga as conseqüências de ignorar a heterogeneidade dos preços na 
estimação de markups com uso de microdados. Demonstra-se que, ao ignorar tal 
heterogeneidade, as estimativas de markups são severamente tendenciosas em direção a um, 
independente do nível de competição.  Para demonstrar tal resultado, constrói-se um modelo 
econométrico sob a hipótese de competição monopolística e uma função demanda CES, em um 
mercado de produtos diferenciados. Este modelo leva em conta a heterogeneidade não 
observada dos preços e mostra-se simples de estimar, dado que mesmo o método dos Mínimos 
Quadrados Ordinários é válido. Usando dados de fábricas Colombianas, o modelo de produtos 
diferenciados revela estimativas de markups consideravelmente acima da unidade, o que rejeita 




This paper investigates the consequences of ignoring price heterogeneity on the 
estimation of markups using micro-data. I show that ignoring output price heterogeneity yields 
markup estimates severely biased towards one regardless of competitiveness levels. To do so, I 
set up an econometric model that assumes monopolistic competition and a CES demand 
function in a differentiated product market. This model controls for unobserved price 
heterogeneity and is easy to estimate since OLS is applicable. Using data from Colombian 
plants, the differentiated product model reveals markup estimates considerably higher than one, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Is a certain industry competitive? If not, what is the degree of market 
power in this industry? Answering theses questions has always been a central concern 
in industrial organization. One of the most important contributions in this research 
subject was formulated by Hall (1988, 1990), who proposed an interesting framework 
where markups, returns scale and productivity can be estimated from a simple 
production function.  
 
Most studies using Hall’s approach used industry level data. However, the 
need to study firms’ behavior (e.g, entry and exit patterns, markups and productivity) 
at more disaggregate levels turned necessary the use of plant-level data.  The 
advantages of utilizing more disaggregated data are twofold. First, it avoids the 
aggregation bias inherently present in industry level panel data. Second, it is more 
consistent with the underlying theoretical models where the decision unit is a firm, 
not an industry. However, it poses an additional difficulty, often neglected, in the 
estimation of production functions that is particular to the use firm-level data: 
unobserved quantities. Most practitioners ignore this problem and uncover output by 
simply deflating revenue by an aggregate price index. For the manufacturing sector, 
however, this may not be a suitable assumption since for even narrowly defined 
industries one might expect some degree of price dispersion. 
 
This paper shows that ignoring price heterogeneity in a differentiated good 
market yields price-cost ratio estimates severely biased towards one regardless of 
competitiveness levels and that an econometric model that embodies firm specific 
prices implies much higher markups. 
 
To set up the econometric model, I add to the production function 
assumptions about firms and consumer behavior. In this context, this model is a 
natural extension to previous studies that used a similar framework but emphasized 
different objects. Klette and Griliches (1996) argued that simple OLS estimates of 
internal returns to scale that ignored the ratio of firm-specific price to the aggregate 
price index are asymptotically downward biased. They assumed monopolistic 
competition and identified the internal returns scale and the elasticity of substitution 
in a price adjusted revenue production function. Focusing on the productivity measure 
but using the same framework, Melitz (2000) finds that the productivity index is also 
downward biased and spuriously procyclical. 
 
Building on this methodology – defined as KGM from now on- I develop 
a technique for estimating markups that assumes monopolistic competition and a CES 
demand function in a differentiated product market. This model controls for 
unobserved price heterogeneity and is easy to estimate since OLS is applicable. These 
nice features, however, comes at a cost: strong assumptions on the firm’s decision 
model. For this reason a separate section is set aside to analyze the robustness of the 
 
2conclusions once these assumptions are relaxed, at least for the capital input. All 
regressions are performed with data on Colombian plants at the three-digit level 
classification according to ISIC from the period of 1979 to 1987. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a simple model that 
highlights the consequences of omitting output price variation is derived. Section III 
describes the data and the construction of variables. The estimation results are 
presented and discussed in section IV. Further, this paper devotes a separate segment- 
section V- to evaluate the sensitivity of our conclusions once the strong assumption 
on the input decision process is relaxed. And finally, the last section presents some 
concluding remarks.   
 
II.  MODEL 
 
I begin by assuming monopolistic competition in industry j where firm i 
faces a demand function given by 
 



















Where Rt is the total revenue of industry j, Pt is an aggregate price index 
and σ (σ>1) is the demand elasticity, which is also the elasticity of substitution. It is 
straightforward to show that the markup is constant across firms and equal to 
) 1 /( − σ σ . This formulation is intuitively appealing. As goods become more 
substitutable (σ goes to infinity) the markup approaches the competitive outcome. 
 




3 adjusted by a term W that indexes the productivity levels and a random 
error N.  
Therefore, after defining ) , , ( ) , , (
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following production function can be written as  
 




Where F is homogeneous of degree γ in capital, labor and materials, and 
of degree one in W and N. Note that the assumption of linear homogeneity in W is 
made without loss of generality since this is just an index. 
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Log differentiating (2), defining the lowercases as the log of the variables 
defined above and dropping the time index yield 
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It’s also assumed that firms dynamic optimization problem can be well 
approximated by successive and independent static decision problems and that factor 
markets are competitive. Then, with the demand equation (1) firm’s input choice 
problem imposes the following equality at each period t 
 






Pi, rj, and Fj represent respectively firm i’s output price, the price of the j-
th factor of production and the derivative of F with respect to this factor.  
Now, it is possible to derive the simple expression for the inputs 
coefficients since 
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Where µ is the markup and αij is the revenue share of input j. Substituting 
(5) into (3) yields 
 
(6)             i i
j
ij i dn dw dx dq + + = ∑α µ
This equation, first derived by Hall (1988) implies that the output 
elasticity with respect to the j-th input is just this input’s revenue share adjusted by a 
measure of firms’ market power. It contains the Solow residual formulation as a 
particular case. Indeed, in a competitive environment the Total Factor Productivity 
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4Equation (6) can be rewritten to express output growth as a function of 
returns to scale and a cost-share weighted bundle of input growth (Hall,1990) as 
follows 
 
(7)             i i
j
j
ij i dn dw dx c dq + + = ∑ γ
The symbols γ and c represent returns to scale and cost share respectively. 
To derive the equation above note that the definition of returns to scale implies 
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= α  (TCi represents firm’s i total cost). From this equation and (8) it easy to 
show that (6) implies (7). Obviously, it is possible to work backwards and obtain (7) 
from (6). 
 
Hall’s formulation - equations (6) and (7) - became a widely used 
technique. It allowed researchers, using data sets at various aggregation levels, to 
obtain output elasticities, returns to scale, productivity indexes, as well as a measure 
of market power (µ) from simple production function estimations. However, in most 
data sets, firms report revenue, not absolute quantities nor prices. A usual way to 
proxy output is to divide firms’ revenues by an aggregate price index, common to all 
firms.  
 
This approach is justified by the assumption of a homogeneous product 
market. In this case, the price index coincides with firms’ individual prices and the 
proxy is a perfect measure of each firm production level. However, ignoring 
fluctuations of firm-specific prices relative to the price index in a differentiated 
product industry can yield severe econometric problems as mentioned in the 
introduction. In this way, I shall develop a model that takes this potential distortion 
into account. 
 
Controlling for unobserved output 
 
Taking the log-difference of (1) and rearranging the revenue identity 
(Rit=Pit.Qit) allow us to write  
(9)           ) ( ) ( t t t it it dp dr dp dp dq − + − − = σ  
(10)           t it it t it dp dp dq dp dr − + = −
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The KGM methodology controls for unobserved output by combining the 
demand equation (9), the revenue identity (10) and the cost-share based production 
function (7), yielding 
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This equation illustrates the importance of controlling for unobserved 
prices for the estimation of returns to scale γ and productivity dw. It introduces the 
elasticity of substitution parameter σ and therefore a markup (µ=σ/(σ-1)) measure in 
the model. Thus, if firms have some market power (µ>1) and produce heterogeneous 
goods, γ and dw will be downward biased.    
 
Departing from this framework, I shall demonstrate that using the revenue 
share in lieu of the cost share production function (7) yields an interesting equation 
that circumvents some of the problems in estimating (11) and identifies a source of 
bias in the markup estimation. 
 
Indeed, combining (6), instead of (7), with (9) and (10) results in 
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Note that the parameter on the input bundle cancels out, such that: 
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The estimation of (13) has several advantages over the KGM method -
equation (11). First, since the factor inputs variables appear on the LHS we do not 
have to worry about their potential correlation with the productivity term. Therefore, 
even the OLS estimator is consistent. This avoids the notoriously difficult task of 
searching for good instruments in micro data studies. The equation above also 
contains the Solow residual as a particular case. If the market is in perfect 
competition, i.e the coefficient on (drt –dpt)  is zero, equation (13) is just the 
computation rule for the Solow residual.  
Roeger (1995) also develops a strategy to estimate
1 production function 
parameters that avoids instrumentation and that controls for unobserved nominal 
prices. However, his methodology only works under the hypothesis of constant 
                                                 
1 See Konings and Vandenbussche(2004) for a firm level application of Roegers’s methodology. 
 
6returns to scale. Omitting variations in this parameter can cause an upward 
(downward) bias in the markup estimate if returns to scale are decreasing (increasing) 
as shown by Basu and Fernald (1997).  
 
Ignoring price heterogeneity 
 
Suppose we are trying to measure markups by proxying unobserved output 
with the ratio of output revenue to a common aggregate price index. Then, equation 
(6) becomes 
 
(14)            it it
j
j
it ijt t it dn dw dx dp dr + + = − ∑α µ
Estimating variations of (14), several plant–level data studies have 
supported markets with low markups, usually close to one. For example, Klette 
(1999) using establishment data from the manufacturing sector in Norway finds 
markups ranging from 0.972 to 1.088. Although his estimates are statistically 
different from one, they are incredibly close to this number. Using a large sample of 
Italian firms, Botasso and Sembenelli (2001) find results of the same order of 
magnitude for the markup estimates. Below, I argue that these results are driven by a 
misspecification of the production function
2. 
 
Indeed, if we believe that (13) is the true data generating process, those 
estimates are not so surprising at all. By comparing (13) to (14) and defining µ )  as a 
consistent estimator of µ as it appears in (14) it easy to show that plim µ ) =1. That is, 
the markup measure should be one regardless of competitive levels, or at least evolve 





The data set analyzed in this paper was obtained from the census of 
Colombian manufacturing plants, collected by the Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), and was cleaned by Roberts (1996). It covers all 
plants in the manufacturing sector for the 1979-1981 period and plants with ten or 
more employees between 1982 and 1987. This study considers six different sectors at 
the three digit level: 311 (Food Products), 322 (Clothing and Apparel), 381 (Metal 
Products), 342 (Printing and Publishing), 383 (Electronic Machinery and Equipment) 
and 384 (Transportation Equipment). It should be noted that I randomly selected 
these industries for this study and that I paid no attention to the idiosyncrasies of 
neither of them. This is justified here on the basis that the objective in this paper is to 
                                                 
2 These papers actually use a different representation of the production function where capital is held 
fixed. However, specification (14) serves as a better introduction to the problem caused by the 
omission of price heterogeneity. In later section, I shall argue that similar arguments arise once fixed 
capital is assumed.  
 
7illustrate the methodological problems of ignoring price heterogeneity rather than 
providing a detailed study for each industry. However, an application of this 
methodology to study a particular industry in the Colombia manufacturing sector 
would be a natural extension of this work. 
 
Input data are available for book value of capital, number of employees 
and book value of intermediate inputs. Intermediate inputs include material, fuel and 
energy that are bundled together to form a unique measure M entering the equations 
defined in the last section. The value of gross output is also reported.  Price deflators 
for the inputs and aggregate output are taken form Colombian National accounts and 




This section presents the markup estimates according to the misspecified 
model (14) and the true model (13) for selected 3-digit industries in the Colombian 
manufacturing sector. The strategy in this section consists of estimating both models 
through OLS and verifying the claim that ignoring price heterogeneity by deflating 
output with an aggregate price index yields markup estimates whose asymptotic value 
should be one regardless of competition levels. 
 
One problem arises in this strategy. OLS estimation of (14) does not yield 
consistent estimators of the true value of µ  (µ0=1) in (14) due to the positive 
correlation between input choices and productivity. It is a standard exercise to show 
that OLS result in the overestimation of the relevant parameter. Alternative methods 
to remedy this problem could be applied, e.g IV and the Olley an Pakes (1996) 
estimators. Nonetheless, OLS results proved to be sufficient to validate the argument 
I am trying to put forward.  
 
As presented in the first column of Table 1 the magnitudes of the markups 
are close to one although statistically different from unity for all industries except for 
342. Thus, even though we do not control for the sources of upward biases, the basic 
prediction that OLS estimates of the markup estimates based on (14) should be close 
to one still comes through. If we were to have controlled for these biases the 
coefficient would presumably be lower and even less plausible as markups.  
 
The remaining task is to compare these results with the estimation of 
markups according to the assumed true model, represented here by equation (13). 
Since the input data are placed on the LHS of equation (13), I do not have to worry 
about the simultaneity bias. Thus simple OLS regressions can beapplied without 
strong assumptions on the co-movements of productivity and input use. Note that a 
significant 1/σ estimate implies imperfect competition (σ is finite) whereas a 
insignificant estimate supports the alternative hypothesis of perfect competition .The 
implied markups (σ/σ-1) reported in the Table 1 show firms with high market power, 
considerably above one in most sectors contrasting with the previous markup 
estimates that are close to one. This is a strong result. Controlling for price 
 
8heterogeneity yields markups much higher that those implied by the misspecified 
model, which already contains an upward bias. 
 
V. Fixed Capital 
 
Although the econometric model represented by (13) is informative with 
respect to consistent estimation of markups, it relies heavily on the assumption that 
firms choose their inputs levels in a sequence of static problems and that factor 
markets are competitive. These assumptions are certainly more problematic for 
capital. In order to decide how much to invest in a given period, agents take into 
account past levels of capital. Indeed, dynamic models of firm’s decisions problems 
have emphasized capital as a state variable, which enters as a parameter in the choice 
of investment, employment, and materials levels.  
 
Hence, these assumptions, crucial to derive (13), may be leading us to 
wrong conclusions about markups. Yet, as I shall argue below, the basic predictions 
of last section remain and the data also supports the same claims as before when 




Now, I assume that capital is fixed in the short-run. Thus, (5) does not 
hold for this input such that (13) is no longer valid. Obviously, the advantages of the 
simple econometric model discussed in the previous sections cannot be claimed in 
this new set up. 
 
With fixed capital and assuming that (5) holds for the remaining inputs the 
log differentiated production function can be written as 




i ij i i dn dw dx dx dx dq + + − + = ∑
= 3 , 2
1 1 ) ( α µ γ
 
Specification (15) is the most commonly used in the literature. Not only it 
relaxes the strong assumptions on capital but it also permits the simultaneous 
estimation of internal returns and markups. However, neglecting price heterogeneity 
still leads to spurious estimates of markups. 
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Equation (15), (9) and (10) form a system that yields the following 
revenue production function 
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Instead of performing inference with equation (16) most researchers 
simply deflate output revenue by a common industry price, resulting in the following 
equation 
 
(17)           it it it
j
it ijtm it t it dn dw dx dx dx dp dr + + − + = − ∑ ) (
1 1 α µ γ
Again, if we believe that (16) is the true model it becomes clear that µ ) , 
now the estimator of µ as it appears in (17), converges in probability to one regardless 
of competition levels. Note that (16) is similar to (13). The difference is the 
coefficient on capital (dx
1) which cannot be placed on the LHS of the estimating 
equation and, since dx
1 is expected to be correlated with the error term, OLS is no 
longer consistent. 
 
In the absence of good disaggregate instruments researchers started 
searching for alternative methods to deal with the simultaneity problem. Leading this 
recent literature, the Olley and Pakes (1996) method – OP henceforth- proposes an 
innovative technique that avoids the difficult task of searching for instruments. This 
method can be briefly summarized as follows. Using the information that investment 
levels are a deterministic function of productivity levels and by inverting this 
relationship, it is possible to uncover the unobservable productivity term as a non-
parametric function of investment and the state variable capital. In this way, the only 
unobservable error term left in the estimation is not expected to be correlated with the 
regressors. 
 
Another way to deal with this problem was developed by Levinhson and 
Petrin (2000)-LP hereafter. They argue that investment may only respond to the “non-
forecastable” part of the productivity term since the capital input may have already 
adjusted to its “forecastable” part. Therefore some correlation would still remain 
between the regressors and the error term. 
 
By using intermediate inputs to proxy the productivity term they are able 
to develop a simpler methodology that improves on the OP methodology since 
intermediate inputs respond to the whole productivity shock. It also avoids a major 
drawback of the OP method, which is the necessity to drop information on industries 
that report zero investment in a given period. 
 
10The availability of intermediate input in our data set and the arguments 
discussed above make LP our natural choice for estimating equation (16). It is worth 
pointing out however two limitations concerning the LP method. First, it does not 
control for the selection bias. That is, unlike OP, it does not use information on firms 
shut down decision rule in the estimation process. Second, it assumes competitive and 
homogeneous product markets to validate the intermediate output as proxy for the 
unobservable term. 
 
While the effects of former limitation can be partially attenuated by the 
use of the full-sample instead of a balanced panel, the effects of the latter requires a 
more careful look into the technique itself, for our model assumes a differentiated 
product market. 
 
The basic result that supports LP is the monotonic relation between 
productivity and the optimal intermediate input level. In a competitive framework it is 
straightforward to prove that. With fixed output and input prices an increase in 
productivity implies a higher intermediate input marginal product at the existing input 
levels. Therefore, firms will decide to expand production so that marginal product 
reduces to equal the intermediate input price. Therefore as output goes up demand for 
inputs also increases. 
 
In an oligopolistic market this monotonic property may not hold. The 
marginal product still follows the same qualitative movements as before, but now 
firms realize that prices decrease as output goes up. Thus, the net effect of a supply 
expansion will ultimately depend on the elasticity of demand. It is possible to set up a 
scenario where one firm facing higher demand elasticity actually reduces output 
whereas another firm facing less responsive prices increases production levels. In a 
monopolistic competitive environment, however, the proof of the monotonic 
condition is very similar to the one presented in Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) and, 
therefore, will be omitted here. 
 
From the monotonic property we can write wit =w(X
1,X
3). Expressing this 





3). Following OP (1996) a third order series approximation to this 
function is used. Plugging it as a regressor in (16) implies  
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3 control for the productivity term, 1/σ can be consistently  estimated by 
OLS. If we were interested in pinning down the coefficient on dx
1 the LP technique 
becomes more involved since it is not identified in the equation above.  
 
11Again, as shown in Table 2 the estimates are not greatly affected once the 
hypothesis of flexible capital is relaxed. The only exception is the 384 sector
3, which 
shows 1/σ estimate (0.069) contrasting with the OLS estimate (0.163) of equation 
(13). For the other sectors the implied markups are considerably above one, providing 
further evidence that the estimation of the misspecified production function yields 
misleading assessments about competition levels.  
 
VI. Final Remarks 
 
This paper shows that neglecting output price heterogeneity in plant or 
firm level studies can be misleading, yielding spurious markup estimates. Assuming a 
differentiated product market, a competitive factor market and flexible inputs yields 
an econometric model that demonstrates that a misspecified version of Hall’s 
equation implies markups equal to one regardless of the market environment. 
Furthermore, this model avoids the search for reliable disaggregated instruments, 
usually difficult to find, and can be consistently estimated by OLS. These consistent 
estimates, in turn, show markups much higher than one. 
 
In a separate section, I recognize that these results are derived under 
restrictive assumptions on the model. Yet, relaxing the most disputable assumption 
imposed in the first part of the paper (flexible capital) does not change the basic result 
of this paper that the simple deflation of revenue by an aggregate price index without  
an adjustment for price heterogeneity yields misleading measurements of market 
power.  
 
The framework developed here is restrictive in at least one dimension. The 
monopolistic competition may not be a reasonable model for many industries. It 
assumes that firms are not big enough to influence the aggregate market variables and 
therefore a price change by one firm has an irrelevant effect on the demand of any 
other firm. This assumption says that each product has no neighbor in the product 
space, which strongly restricts cross-effects and strategic interaction between 
products (Tirole, 1988). The discrete-choice based demand function with oligopolistic 
competition relaxes some of the undesirable results of the monopolistic setup. 
Consumers choose among N products given the product’s prices and characteristics. 
Producers, in turn, set optimal prices in a Bertrand fashion. This allows for a richer 
model of cross-effects patterns and interactions among firms. Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1996) develop an econometric methodology to estimate such model using 
market level data on prices and quantities. Along the same lines, but dealing with a 
data set that reports only revenue and total costs, Katayma, Lu and Tybout (2003) use 
a nested logit model to uncover firm-specific prices, marginal costs and other 
measures of firm behavior. This is certainly the path to be followed by those looking 
for more interactive market setups. Therefore, this paper’s message about spurious 
markup estimates should be taken with caution since it limits itself to raise a red flag 
                                                 
3 More information on this sector would be necessary to interpret this result. 
 
12for practitioners who are willing to measure markups with limited data under the 
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Specification Equation(18)   
  1/σ Estimates  Implied Markups 
311 0.417 
(0.2154) 
1.71 
 
322 0.434 
(0.1216) 
1.77 
381 
 
0.208 
(0.1944) 
1.27 
342 0.443 
(0.0412) 
1.79 
383 
 
-0.2116  
(0.3510) 
- 
384 
 
0.0699 
(0.5761) 
1.08 
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